the property rights. In such a system, the resource rent corresponds to the market value of ITQs. 4 In theory, the market price of ITQs should be equal to the discounted value of all future and anticipated profi ts generated by the use of the fi shing rights. 5 In other words, the value of all ITQs is equal to the expected earnings generated by the fi shery. And as in the case of the shares of a company, this is also the market value of the fi shery. According to Arnason 6 , the total value of permanent ITQs in Iceland, concerning about 35 fi sheries, exceeded US $4bn in 2005. In Australia, where southern bluefi n tuna fi shing is regulated by an ITQ scheme, the value of the ITQs, based on permanent transfers, was about AUS $850m in early 2008. This paper considers the ability of ITQ systems to favour a political compromise, at either local or international lev-1 The cross-board production price paid to operative Mediterranean purse seiners for their MBT catches has been hardly covering their operating costs since 2000. For example, they received only 3 euros/ kg in 2003, 2.90 euros/kg in 2004 and 2.60 euros/kg in 2005. This corresponds to 15-20% of the wholesale price for MBT in Japan, net of taxes, fees, transport and processing costs (see WWF: Race for the last bluefi n: Capacities of the purse seine fl eet targeting bluefi n tuna in the Mediterranean Sea and estimated capacity reduction needs, 2008, http://assets.panda.org/downloads/med_tuna_overcapacity. pdf).
Overfi shing generally arises from a bad specifi cation of the property rights to fi sh stocks. It is exacerbated when the resource is shared among several nations unable to coordinate a collective action that would be ecologically and economically more effi cient. This is the current situation of the Mediterranean bluefi n tuna (MBT). This resource, highly valued in Japan, has been increasingly overfi shed since the early 1990s. Mediterranean countries have been unable to accept and/or to respect a tightening of their catches and, as a result, have produced two classic outcomes of a tragedy of commons: i) MBT stocks are threatened; ii) most of the resource rent has not been received by Mediterranean fi sheries but captured downward in the sector. 1 The resource rent is a surplus generated from resource harvesting above and beyond all extraction and exploration costs, including return on capital employed. Campbell and Haynes 2 defi ne it as "a component of earnings from the exploitation of a resource and such that it is the amount that would be paid for the unexploited resource if an effi cient market for the resource existed." Since Gordon 3 , it has been shown that this rent is completely dissipated and lost for fi shermen when the resource has a "common pool" characteristic and access to it is not regulated.
It is widely admitted and has been observed that the implementation of a system of individual transferable fi shing quotas (ITQ) increases the revenue of fi sheries, as a larger part of the resource rent accrues to the owners of Julien Hanoteau*
A Mediterranean Agreement for Tuna Conservation: The Political Benefi t of an International ITQ Scheme
Mediterranean bluefi n tuna have been increasingly overfi shed since the early 1990s, but the countries involved have so far been unable to reach an agreement on an ecologically and economically more effi cient use of this shared resource. A system of individual transferable quotas could foster international agreement on reducing the total allowable catches. One condition for this, however, would be that fi sheries be adequately compensated for the opportunity costs of decommissioning vessels.
Trade in Fishing Quotas
In the fourth section, we simulate the equilibrium characteristics of a Mediterranean ITQ scheme for MBT, using micro-level data on the fi shing effi ciency and capacities of the vessels. We run two geographical scenarios; the fi rst system is organised for Mediterranean European member states only. In the second scenario, all the main Mediterranean tuna fi shing nations participate. The choice to set the TAC to 15,000 tonnes follows ICCAT experts' recommendations for 2009. Each of these scenarios will be presented and analysed according to the equilibrium redistribution of fi shing efforts, the international "trade" in quotas and the reduction in the proportion of catch capacities and in the number of vessels.
In the fi nal section, we estimate the value of MBT resource rent. For this, we transfer the 2008 ITQ prices from the Australian bluefi n tuna fi sheries to our Mediterranean case. This enables us to approximate the resource rent distribution that would result from an initial quota allocation based on the ICCAT 2007 agreement. We then propose an alternative rule that would maximise the political acceptability of cutting the TAC. Indeed, we fi nd that with such a distribution, all Mediterranean fi sheries could be at least compensated for their net opportunity costs induced by the new regulatory ecological constraint. We then discuss the results and conclude.
The Australian ITQ System for Southern Bluefi n Tuna
Australia, Japan, and New Zealand agreed to limit their catches of southern bluefi n tuna (SBT) in 1982. Two years later, the Australian authorities implemented a system of ITQs within their fi shing zone and allocated the quotas to 136 individuals and companies. The initial allocation rule was the outcome of bargaining and stated that quotas would be granted for free to all signifi cant participants in the fi shery prior to the implementation of the system (those who caught at least 15 tonnes of SBT during the three preceding seasons), on a boat-by-boat basis. 10 These ITQs, transferable both permanently and within the season, are rights to harvest a certain proportion of the TAC, which has been reduced almost yearly. The Australian fl eet complied with the binding regulation and restructured quickly after 1984. After only one year, one-third of the boats had left the fi shery, while by the end of 1986, two-thirds had left. These two-thirds were comprised of els, for the conservation of a shared resource. The reduction in the total allowable catches (TAC) is likely to induce short-run costs for interest groups, explaining their opposition to the tightening of the environmental constraint, even if they may benefi t from it in the longer run. For example, fi sheries may lose in terms of profi ts and jobs during the early stage of the ecological reform. The initial allocation of quotas, which commands the redistribution of the resource rent, may be designed so as to compensate these costs and thus raise fi sheries' acceptance of the environmental policy. This compensation mechanism would be an important means of consensus dynamics and favour an international environmental agreement for the conservation of a common resource.
Matulich and Sever 7 and Kerr 8 have underlined this principle and we apply it to the conservation of bluefi n tuna in the Mediterranean Sea. 9 We show that it is possible to fi nd an initial allocation of the ITQs that would leave the fi sheries' constituents at least not worse off in the short run, following a cut in the TAC. In order to do so, we simulate the implementation of an international ITQ system, organised for purse seiners, with a global TAC set to 15,000 tonnes of bluefi n tunas per year.
We estimate the MBT resource rent, based on the value of ITQs, and we show that it would exceed the cost induced by the large decommissioning of tuna purse seiners necessary to comply with the new TAC. We analyse which initial allocation of quotas among countries would maximise the political acceptability of the conservation measure. Then, we compare it to the current distribution scheme as agreed in the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT). In order to do this, we develop a simple model to derive the equilibrium characteristics of ITQ schemes and, in particular, the redistribution of fi shing efforts based on micro-level productivity. We show how the value of the ITQs may compensate the costs for the vessels' owners and due to the TAC reduction. This model is presented in the third section of this paper, whereas the second briefl y describes the Australian ITQ system for bluefi n tuna conservation. The search for a Pareto-safe allocation between fi shing and processing sectors, in: Land Economics, Vol. 75, No. 2, 1999, pp. 203-219. 8 S. K e r r : The political economy of structural reform in natural resource use: observations from New Zealand, MOTU WP, 2006, http:// www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/50/36883151.pdf. 9 This way of using the initial allocation of property rights so as to ensure the political acceptability of the environmental policy has also been put forward by R. S t a v i n s : What can we learn from the grand policy experiment? Lessons from SO 2 allowance trading, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1998, pp. 69-88 , but for the control of atmospheric pollution using emissions trading schemes.
Trade in Fishing Quotas
If c is the unit cost of effort and q i the level of catches of vessel i, then its operating costs are cq i θ i . To simplify, we assume that c is constant among vessels, which is not the reality of the Mediterranean purse seine fl eets, given differences among countries in the prices of fuel, labour costs and taxes. The fi shing activity is regulated with the effi cient organisation and implementation of an international ITQ system, and such that n Σ i=1 q i = T, with T the annual TAC. Each vessel i is a price-taker and can only catch q i during a fi xed period if it holds enough ITQs. Let Z be the permanent value of a quota. Using it during a period costs z = rZ, which is its rental value. 17 Quotas are initially granted for free, and each vessel receiving a quantity a i may buy extra quotas at a price z. If the fi sherman uses the quotas received for free, he will nonetheless consider an opportunity cost z, as these quotas could alternatively be sold on the market. Vessel owners support an additional cost rK i which is the annual payback of the initial capital investment (amortisation cost of the fully equipped vessel). Vessel owners must make large enough margins (above operating costs) so as to cover this capital cost. If they decide to leave the sector, they still have to support this cost, in particular if the market value of the vessel is lower than the residual capital cost. 18 To simplify, we assume that decommissioning tuna fi shing boats induces an annual net cost rK i for their owners. For a given market price P of fi sh, rational vessel owners choose the level of activity q i that maximises their profi t π i and such that:
From the fi rst order condition, one gets:
17 This simple relationship between the rental price and purchase price of quota holds under the simplifying assumption that expected lease prices and discount rates remain constant in the future. See R. N e we l , K. P a p p s , J. S a n c h i r i c o , op. cit., p. 2. 18 This is likely the case. As more and more fi sh stocks are overfi shed, transfers of fi shing capacities across fi sheries are limited, thus reducing boats' residual values.
the smallest and oldest vessels and accounted altogether for one-third of the total quotas issued. 11 It was accompanied by a geographical concentration of the fl eet in Port Lincoln, South Australia. The sector adopted new fi shing equipment and techniques which led to an increase in the economic effi ciency of the entire Australian SBT fi shery. 12 Although it is restricted to Australian holders of fi shing licenses, the system permitted the growing involvement of Japanese-operated vessels within Australian fi shing zones through joint ventures. Japanese capital also contributed to the development of tuna ranching in Australian waters.
In 1984, quotas permanently transferred were traded for AUS $800-1,200 per tonne. 13 Their price increased sharply, to AUS $14,500 per tonne in 1991, and peaked at AUS $250-300,000 in 2002, as shown in Figure 1 . By mid-2008 they were worth AUS $175,000 per tonne. 14 The second curve presents the evolution of ITQ prices based on annual leasing. The exchange of ITQs takes place directly within industry, without brokers 15 , and the price of the quotas contributes to the observed increased revenue for those who left the fi shery or remained in it. 16
Equilibrium of an International ITQ System
A fi shery is constituted of N tuna purse seiners, i, with a production technology characterised by a fi shing effi ciency indicator θ i . It indicates the catches per unit of effort (CPUE), given the technology of the vessel and the fi shing techniques employed by the crew, for a given resource abundance. In the static perspective of the model, we assume that θ i varies among vessels but is constant in levels of activity and in the total TAC.
For computational simplicity and given the static perspective of our analysis, we assume that the model is linear in harvest levels and independent of biomass. In addition, individual boat fi shing capacities are considered as fi xed. Relaxing these assumptions would not change our results and conclusions. 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 
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are reduced to rK j and K j , the second terms on the righthand side of equations (4) and (5). These costs could be compensated thanks to the initial allocation of ITQs if it is such that in equations (4) and (5) 
Conditions (6) and (7) could then be a political objective in the negotiations for an agreement on marine resources conservation. Following Matulich and Sever 20 and Kerr 21 , we may assume that this would ensure a minimum level of political acceptability for the ecological constraint.
In order for condition (7) to be satisfi ed, one must have
The resource rent to be allocated is greater than the total cost endured by all the fi shermen having to leave the sector because of the TAC reduction.
An International ITQ System for MBT Conservation

Methodology
In order to simulate the equilibrium of an international ITQ system, we assume that the equilibrium characteristics derived in the previous section hold: only the most effi cient vessels remain in the fi shery and share the TAC, whereas the less effi cient boats sell their quotas and leave. In addition, we assume that each MBT purse seiner i holds enough quotas to harvest its real catch potential (RCP) α i . We can easily replicate this equilibrium characteristic using boat-level data on effi ciency and on RCP. Through a simple data management procedure using Excel, we solve the following equation 22 :
Our data for θ i and α i relies heavily on a report by WWF. 23
From it we take estimates of Mediterranean purse seiners' best average yearly catch potential as a proxy for their real 20 S. M a t u l i c h , M. S e v e r, op. cit. 21 S. K e r r, op. cit. 22 We select the most effi cient vessels and such that the sum of their real catching capacities is equal to the TAC. 23 WWF: Race for the last bluefi n: Capacities of the purse seine fl eet targeting bluefi n tuna in the Mediterranean Sea and estimated capacity reduction needs, 2008, http://www.assets.panda.org/downloads/ med_tuna_overcapacity.pdf. This is vessel i's optimal demand for quotas, expressed in terms of prices. It represents the willingness of the vessel owner to pay for using a quota and is a function of fi shing effi ciency. The vessel owner decides to fi sh (using quotas) as long as z d  z. Using this condition and rearranging (2), we have:
Vessel owners use quotas if their fi shing effi ciency is superior or equal to a threshold θ. Otherwise, they sell them and quit the fi shery. This is a standard result which explains the economic effi ciency of tradable property rights.
On the market, fi shing fi rms demand or supply ITQs according to their willingness to pay, based on their productivities. The most effi cient will be ready to pay a higher price than less effi cient ones, and the latter will sell quotas to the former.
The ITQ price that balances supply and demand also equalises the marginal productivities of the remaining fi shing fi rms. These fi rms are the most effi cient and share the TAC, whereas the least effi cient have left the fi shery. This virtuous mechanism contributes to the higher efficiency of the whole fi shery, which has been empirically confi rmed in the case of Iceland fi sheries 19 and, more relevant for our purposes, in the case of the Australian southern bluefi n tuna fi shery, as described above.
Fishermen j  N, deciding to leave the fi shery and to lease their quotas to other fi rms i ≠ j, will receive the following periodical profi t:
The discounted value of all their future profi t fl ows is
The terms z a j and Z a j are the shares of the annual and permanent resource rents accruing to the vessel owners which are raised due to the implementation of an ITQ system. Assuming a perfectly competitive fi shery, there would be no profi t, except the resource rent. In the situation of a common pool resource, the rent is likely to disappear due to a collective action problem. Thus, the annual and permanent costs of decommissioning a vessel 19 
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long liners. To account for this, we consider an adjusted TAC corresponding to 85% of the aforementioned 15,000 tonnes. Column 5 indicates the percentage variation of current real catch potentials (column 2) that would be necessary in order to comply strictly with TAC reduction objectives (column 4) and with no trade in quotas. The sixth column presents the RCP redistribution between countries that would result, in equilibrium, from the strict enforcement of the TAC, coupled with the implementation of an ITQ system. Column 7 gives the percentage variations between current RCP (column 2) and the ITQ equilibrium (column 6).
The last column indicates the number of MBT purse seiners that would remain per country in the case of equilibrium.
With the implementation of an ITQ scheme among Mediterranean EU member states only, Italy would lose 92% of its catch capacities (Table 2, column 7) instead of 72% without trade in quotas (column 5). In contrast, Croatia would benefi t from this scheme because its catch capacities loss would be cut from 92% without trade to 54%. This is because the Italian MBT purse seine fl eet is, on average, the least effi cient in Europe, compared to the Croatian fl eet, which is newer, and thus more effi cient. In both cases, France would lose 73-75% of its capacities (23 of its 39 vessels). Spain would lose half its fl eet instead of one-third. Greece and Malta would each keep their single operative purse seine vessels. catch potential. Taking these estimates is justifi ed given that Mediterranean countries usually underreport their catches. Data is given per country and per length of purse seiners. Their length overall (LOA) is:
• 20m  LOA < 28.6m • 28.6m  LOA  38.5m • 38.5m < LOA.
To measure fi shing effi ciency, we take the ratio between vessel i's real catch potential and its gross fi shing capacities (GFC) f i :
f i is the product of a vessel's gross reported tonnage (GRT, in tonnes), its length (LOA, in metres) and its installed horsepower (IHP, in horsepower), such that f i = LOA*GRT*IHP/1,000,000.00
Our study covers 614 purse seine vessels that were operative in 2007 or under construction and about to be launched. This provides a picture of the tuna fi shing capacities that will be operative in the Mediterranean Sea in the near future. These vessels include multi-species purse seine vessels as we make the pessimistic assumption that the possibility to transfer catch capacities are limited, given that most other species are already overfi shed as well. Table 1 presents the distribution of the MBT purse seiners fl eet between the main fi shing nations, and the average effi ciency per size of vessels.
Redistribution of Fishing Capacities in the Mediterranean Sea
Tables 2 and 3 present simulations of an international ITQ system equilibrium under the two scenarios. The fi rst column lists the countries participating in the scheme: EU Mediterranean member states for Table 2 and Mediterranean countries for Table 3 . The second and third columns present the estimated real catch potentials of each country, in tonnes and in number of vessels. The fourth column shows the initial allocation of quotas between countries which would result from the strict implementation of the 2007 ICCAT agreement. 24 As we are considering an ITQ scheme organised for purse seiners only, we must account for the duality of MBT fi shery. Since the mid-1990s, 85% of the MBT on average have been caught by purse seiners and the remainder by 24 The proportion of the TAC that is given to a country corresponds to the one agreed in 2007 in the framework of the ICCAT. Trade in Fishing Quotas national transfers of quotas as shown below. ITQs would be exchanged at the market equilibrium price, leading to international fi nancial fl ows. In order to simulate the price of an MBT ITQ in a Mediterranean system, we transfer the price of SBT ITQ from the Australian system. 25 In September 2008, SBT ITQ was priced at AUS $175,000 for permanent transfer and AUS $9,000 for annual lease. 26 We take these prices and convert them. We acknowledge that this simple and static procedure for estimating the price of ITQ is approximate. An alternative solution could be a dynamic simulation of the ITQ market, integrating a bioeconomic model of the fi shery's biomass being rebuilt over time, and so simulating the appreciation of the value of ITQ over time. Such a sophisticated approach would nonetheless rest necessarily on numerous assumptions on parameters, and as a result, the ITQ price would still be approximate. 25 The exchange rate is €0.57 for AUS $1, which was the average exchange rate in September 2008. 26 Clean Seas Tuna Limited, op. cit. In mid-2008, the price for permanent transfer was almost 20 times higher than the leasing price. The theory predicts a relation between these two prices that is based on the discounting value of a perpetuity. This is what R. N e w e l l , K. P a p p s and J. S a n c h i r i c o , op. cit. observe in the case of New Zealand fi sheries. On average, the ITQ price, based on permanent transfer, is approximately equal to 10 times the price of an annual lease over the sample period, and roughly equal to the present value of a perpetuity discounted at 10%. This is also what was observed on average on the Australian market for Southern bluefi n tuna (SBT) fi shing quotas until 2004, as shown in Figure 1 .
Now consider a Mediterranean ITQ system involving Middle
Eastern and North African (MENA) countries (Table 3) . Compared to the situation without international trade in quotas, some MENA countries would lose additional capacities, such as Algeria (91% instead of 61%), Tunisia (71% instead of 67%) and Morocco, which would lose its single ship. In contrast, Turkey and Libya would benefi t, with losses reduced from 98 to 88% and from 88 to 65% respectively.
Compared to the previous scenario with trade among European countries only, France, Croatia and Italy would lose additional capacities, whereas the situation would remain unchanged for Spain, Greece and Malta. This means that with a larger ITQ scheme involving southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, European member states would lose additional fi shing capacities altogether to the benefi t of MENA countries. This transfer would enable these latter countries to ease the adjustment of their purse seine fl eets.
International Transfers of Quotas
Tables 4 and 5 present the international transfers of quotas for the two scenarios in equilibrium of the international ITQ system and the resulting international fi nancial fl ows. A country's purchase or sale of permits depends on at least two main factors: fi rst, the country's fi shing effort in equilibrium, which is a function of its fl eet's effi ciency relative to foreign fl eets, and secondly, the initial quotas allocation. If the country were producing the exact equilibrium distribution of catch efforts, there would be no trade. As already explained, we have arbitrarily chosen an allocation based on the 2007 ICCAT regime. It is a function of historical backgrounds, the result of political bargaining, and does not seem to weight current catch capacities signifi cantly. This initial allocation scheme would lead to important inter- 
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portion than in the previous scenario. Indeed, enlarging the system to MENA countries would enhance diversity among national purse seiner vessel fl eets, both in terms of size (real catch capacities) and in terms of effi ciency. Therefore, this would raise the gains from trading quotas.
Morocco, Italy, France, Spain and Algeria would sell significant shares of their donated quotas (Table 5 ). They would earn revenues ranging from €2.7m to €7.3m in the case of leasing and from €52m to €142m in the case of permanent transfers. The main buyers would be Turkey, Croatia and Libya. These three countries share common characteristics: their fl eets expanded quickly during the 1990s, and they are given quotas within the framework of ICCAT in quantities well below their RCP.
Altogether, European countries would be net sellers of ITQs, whereas MENA countries would be buyers. This means that considering solely the criterion of fi shing effi ciency compared to the ICCAT regime, MENA countries should be allocated more quotas.
Political Acceptability of an MBT TAC Reduction
The MBT Resource Rent
Based on our estimates of ITQ prices, and assuming a TAC set to 15,000 tonnes in 2009, the MBT fi sheries would be worth €4.6bn, the total value of quotas in the case of permanent transfer. This would generate an annual rent of €77m, which is the total annual leasing value of the quotas. These fi gures are certainly underestimated, because our rough estimates of ITQ prices cannot account for the potential price
The simple procedure we use in this study produces fi gures that should be taken cautiously, but we consider that they are a good illustration for the purpose of this political economy analysis.
SBT and MBT are good substitutes on the Japanese tuna market. For example, in 2003 For example, in -2004 , the price of SBT dropped in Japan (and consequently, the price of SBT ITQ as shown in Figure 1 ) due to a signifi cant rise in the supply of bluefi n tuna from the Mediterranean Sea. 27
With 7,326 tonnes of quotas (adjusted TAC) allocated to the purse seiners of Italy, Spain, Cyprus, Malta, France and Croatia, 2,142 quotas, or 29% of the total issued, would be transferred internationally. The main sellers would be Italy, due to the major adjustment of its fl eet, followed by Spain and France. The main buyer would be Croatia due to the fact that the ICCAT-based donation of quotas, well below its real catch capacities, has grown quickly since the mid-1990s. In the case of a seasonal lease of the quotas, and given our estimates of ITQ prices, Italy would receive €6.6m annually (Table 4 , column 2). With a permanent transfer of the quotas, the initial revenue would be €128.7m. In Spain, these fi gures would be €3.2m and €63.1m respectively, and for France, €0.7m and €14.6m. The sale of ITQs would thus offer signifi cant compensation to fi shermen or vessel owners leaving the fi sheries. As a counterpart, Croatia would pay €10.1m for annual leasing or €195.5m for permanent transfers. As explained below, this cost would be passed on to customers, and therefore not supported by the fi shing industry.
In a Mediterranean system, with a total of 11,338 tonnes of ITQs granted to the purse seiners of these countries, 4,938 quotas would be transferred. This is the equivalent of 43.5% of the total quantity issued, which is a higher pro- Malta -108.0 -0.6 -10.8 -1960.0 -10.1 -195.5 Therefore, there exists an initial allocation of the annual resource rent such that each Mediterranean fi shing nation could be at least compensated for the opportunity cost of decommissioning some of its purse seiners. This distribution rule must satisfy, as a minimum condition, the donation of resource rent proposed in column 5 of Table 7. effect induced by a signifi cant TAC reduction. Table 6 presents the distribution of this rent among purse seine fl eets by country and according to a 2007 ICCAT-based allocation of the adjusted TAC. The annual rent will be passed on to consumers through a rise in the producer price and should accrue to the owners of the resource. This happens with ITQs as they set property rights on the resource. They must be considered as an input to the fi shing activity, with the opportunity cost of their use (their market value) to be passed on through the producer price. The annual rent already exists in the bluefi n tuna market. It is passed on to fi nal consumers but does not end up in the Mediterranean fi shing sectors due to the property rights regime on the resource and to the tuna sector's industrial structure.
Croatia
Raising the Political Acceptability of a TAC Abatement
This situation offers additional arguments supporting the organisation of a Mediterranean ITQ system. First, it would frame and facilitate the cooperation between Mediterranean fi sheries. Second, the market mechanisms would induce the spontaneous internalisation of the MBT resource rent in producer prices. This would raise Mediterranean fi sheries' revenue, eventually compensating them for the costs of cutting the MBT TAC, depending on the quotas' initial allocation. 
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Given our simulations, and compared to a distribution scheme based on the 2007 ICCAT agreement, only Turkey, Libya and Croatia would need to be given higher quotas.
Conclusion
This paper showed that implementing ITQ systems for the conservation of marine resources can increase the political acceptability of reducing the TAC. Indeed, it enables a regulator to get control over the resource rent and to redistribute it to fi sheries through the initial quota allocation, so as to compensate them for the short-run costs induced by the ecological constraint.
We have applied our analysis to the case of the Mediterranean bluefi n tuna, simulating the equilibrium of an international ITQ system organised for Mediterranean BT purse seiners, or for European ones only, with a TAC set to 15,000 tonnes per year.
We fi nd that the leasing value of all ITQs in 2009, i.e. the annual resource rent, would far exceed the cost of decommissioning all Mediterranean purse seine fl eets. In addition, and in order to have each Mediterranean fi shery at least better off following the international ecological constraint, it would be necessary to slightly modify the initial distribution of the fi shing rights, compared to the one agreed in 2007 in the ICCAT. 
